As fossil-fuel companies publish glossy “net-zero” roadmaps and international investors hunt for high-value “nature-based solutions,” Nigeria’s mangroves have entered a new global marketplace. These carbon-rich ecosystems now attract developers, brokers and buyers of voluntary carbon credits, a business that promises to offset emissions, conserve biodiversity, and channel money into coastal communities.
The promise is seductive: mangroves store massive amounts of carbon per hectare and can be protected or restored at far lower cost than industrial decarbonization. The risk, however, is that the same financial architecture that created extractive industries in the Niger Delta is now being repurposed to monetize conservation, often with little transparency, weak safeguards for local land rights, and skewed benefits that favour investors and intermediaries. This investigation maps the money flows, exposes key actors, and assesses whether communities in the Delta are trading their land and livelihoods for uncertain climate finance.
Why mangroves matter and why they attract money
Mangrove forests are among the planet’s most carbon-dense ecosystems. Nigeria’s Niger Delta contains the largest continuous mangrove block in Africa and holds hundreds of millions of tonnes of “irrecoverable” carbon, carbon that, once lost, cannot be restored on human timescales. That makes them highly attractive to companies seeking high-impact offsets. Conservation groups and scientists underscore both the climate value and the ecological services mangroves provide: fisheries, storm buffering, and livelihoods.
Commercial interest is now translating into deals. Regional reporting and market analyses show governments and private developers are exploring blue-carbon projects that can generate tradable credits sometimes as part of broader “Mangrove Breakthrough” initiatives and donor-backed grant windows. Nigeria has even begun drafting a national roadmap to protect and monetize its mangroves to access billions in blue-carbon funding and grants.
The players: oil majors, brokerages, financiers and new “conservation” firms
The ecosystem of actors in blue-carbon deals is layered and international:
- International oil companies and emitting firms want high-quality credits to satisfy voluntary net-zero claims or compliance commitments. Many prefer high-impact blue-carbon credits because fewer credits (and therefore less money) are needed to claim large offsets. Corporate climate reports from major energy companies show continued interest in nature-based offsets as part of broader neutrality strategies.
- Project developers and blue-carbon firms (some newly formed, others backed by overseas investors) identify, package and sell credits. They negotiate access to lands, sometimes with state actors and hire technical partners to measure carbon stock and submit methodologies to standards bodies. Local or foreign brokers then place credits with corporate buyers. Investigations across Africa have documented new companies and platforms seeking large land or coastal concessions for credit projects.
- Financial intermediaries (impact funds, blended-finance vehicles, and development banks) provide upfront capital, underwrite risk, or offer guarantees to attract private buyers into blue-carbon schemes. That finance often comes with technical assistance budgets and project management fees that flow to consultants rather than communities.
How deals are structured and where the opacity lives
Blue-carbon projects move from scientific measurement to market product via several steps: baseline measurement, project design, community consultation (in theory), issuance of credits against a verified methodology, and sale on the voluntary carbon market. Each step creates revenue lines: consulting fees, verification fees, registration fees, and credit sales. In practice, three common problems arise:
- Bundled or opaque land agreements. Governments or firms claiming rights on behalf of the state may sign memoranda or concessions that grant project developers long-term control over mangrove areas. Investigations in multiple African countries have shown large land deals struck with little or no transparent community consent. The AP documented concerns about Dubai-based companies acquiring large tracts in West Africa for similar “blue carbon” ventures; critics called it “carbon colonialism.”
- High transactional costs and intermediaries. Technical assistance, monitoring, verification and brokerage fees can consume a significant share of the project’s revenue before any cash reaches local communities. The Oakland Institute and other watchdogs have documented how plantation-style or offset projects can reallocate benefits toward investors and management firms rather than local people.
- Questionable additionality and permanence. Carbon standards require that credits represent emissions reductions or sequestration that would not have happened otherwise. Critics argue that many protection-based offsets (avoided deforestation or mangrove protection) struggle to prove additionality or long-term permanence, especially when political regimes change or enforcement is weak. Scientific literature cautions that restoration, monitoring and permanence assumptions need rigorous, long-term verification.
Who benefits and who stands to lose?
On paper, blue-carbon projects promise community co-benefits: jobs in restoration, agricultural diversification, and payments for ecosystem services. On the ground, however, there are mounting reports of uneven outcomes:
- Investors and buyers capture the market upside through credit sales and reputational gains tied to “green” portfolios. Corporations reduce stated net emissions while continuing fossil extraction elsewhere. Company sustainability reports illustrate this strategy: offsets used to neutralize scope-1 or scope-3 emissions while operational fossil activities continue.
- Project developers and consultants earn sizeable upfront fees for design, measurement and verification. Oaklands Institute’s research into plantation and offset finance shows how investor-facing structures can funnel profit to international firms.
- Local communities may receive irregular, small, or delayed payments, if they receive anything at all. Worse, communities risk losing customary access to mangrove resources (fishing, harvesting, burial grounds) when project rules restrict activities to preserve baseline carbon stocks. Independent reporting across Africa has documented cases where land deals proceeded with minimal consultation and legal ambiguity about land tenure.
A pattern emerges: the economic upside concentrates with distant capital, while local rights and livelihoods face new restrictions, an outcome activists have labelled a form of “green colonialism.”
The Delta in focus: evidence from Nigeria
Nigeria’s government and private actors have publicly signalled interest in mapping and unlocking the carbon potential of its mangroves. Conservation bodies point to the Niger Delta as a globally significant blue-carbon store; national conversations are underway about a roadmap to secure grants and participate in multilateral blue-carbon initiatives. But news reporting and policy briefs also show early signs of tension:
- Local reports indicate state authorities and foreign firms exploring rights to develop carbon projects across sizeable coastal tracts, an activity that has generated concern among coastal communities and rights groups about consultation, tenure, and benefit sharing.
- Historical context complicates trust. The Niger Delta bears decades of unresolved oil-related contamination, contested land claims and broken promises from extractive industries. Experience makes communities sceptical of new deals that grant outsiders control over coastal lands, especially when governance structures for monitoring, revenue-sharing and dispute resolution are weak. The Guardian and other outlets have chronicled long-running litigation and grievances against oil majors in the region.
Red flags to watch for in a proposed mangrove credit project
If a developer or government approaches a community with a blue-carbon project, the following indicators should trigger caution:
- Lack of transparent land-tenure documentation. If the state claims land rights without evidence of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) from customary owners, the deal should be treated as suspect.
- Opaque revenue splits. Contracts that do not publish projected revenue shares (for credits sold), or that allocate most commercial rights to developers, risk marginalizing communities.
- Short-term or conditional payments. Payment schemes tied to technical metrics without clear grievance or dispute mechanisms can leave communities exposed if projects fail to perform.
- No independent verification or unclear permanence guarantees. Projects must disclose methodologies, buffer pools for reversals, and long-term custodianship plans.
What needs to change: policy and practice
To avoid repeating a pattern of extraction under a green label, stakeholders should demand the following reforms:
- Transparent contract publication. All agreements, subcontracts and project methodologies tied to blue-carbon projects should be publicly available in full. That includes clauses on tenure, revenue distribution, and dispute resolution.
- Legal recognition of local land and resource rights. National governments must ensure that customary and communal rights are recorded and respected before any carbon concession is granted.
- Mandatory FPIC and equitable benefit-sharing. Projects must be premised on demonstrable, documented consent and equitable sharing of revenue with independent legal counsel for communities.
- Rigorous additionality, permanence and co-benefit verification by credible third parties, and long-term financial mechanisms (endowments, trust funds) that survive political cycles.
- Prohibition of perverse incentives. Donors and buyers should avoid policies that fund “protection” of areas where communities depend on sustainable use for survival, unless alternative livelihood plans are funded and enforced.
Limits of this investigation
This story synthesises public reporting, policy briefs, scientific literature and regional news reporting to identify patterns and risks in blue-carbon development across Africa and in Nigeria. Some details exact contract clauses, confidential revenue splits, or private memoranda, are not publicly accessible. Verifying those requires procurement records, contract disclosures and field interviews with affected communities and project proponents. Where possible, I have cited primary reporting and authoritative analyses; where primary documents were unavailable, I have relied on credible investigative reporting and sector studies.
Conclusion: a contested opportunity
Mangrove protection in the Niger Delta could deliver real climate and community benefits, if designed and governed to prioritise local rights, transparency and long-term stewardship. Without those safeguards, however, the surge of interest in blue carbon risks repeating a familiar story: global capital draws value from local commons while vulnerable communities bear the social and ecological costs. That pattern is not inevitable. It can be broken but only if governments, donors and buyers take seriously the hard work of rights-based, transparent and accountable conservation finance.
